R&D is a main driver of growth, whether by generating new ideas for production or increasing technological transfer. However, R&D itself is risky and faces numerous barriers which may reduce its marginal return. Direct R&D subsides are intended to counteract such barriers, but whether they lead empirically to increased economic growth is unclear. In our structural model of the UK, subsidies o¤set the frictional costs associated with R&D, incentivising innovation and so stimulating productivity growth. We estimate and test this structural model by indirect inference, a method not previously used in work on R&D. We …nd that even temporary cuts to R&D funding have long-lasting impacts on UK economic growth. The power of the test allows us to calculate tight accuracy bounds for our results and for policy reform impacts calculated using the model. These …ndings are of high relevance to the ongoing debate around the future UK innovation environment.
INTRODUCTION
Have government subsidies to private sector research and development boosted UK growth over the past four decades? That is the question tackled in this paper. Starting with Schultz (1953) and Griliches (1958) , an in ‡uential literature links R&D activity to economic growth, and the R&D growth channel is now taken as given by many. However, at the macroeconomic level the causal link between direct subsidies, R&D and successful innovation remains less empirically certain. This paper therefore takes an empirical look at a structural model which embeds that key growth hypothesis. The research question is whether direct government R&D subsidies have incentivised the private sector to conduct R&D, and so enhanced innovation and productivity growth in the UK over the sample . To answer it we use indirect inference (Le et al., 2011) , a powerful and relatively new method which has not yet been applied to the question of R&D subsidy e¤ectiveness.
Private sector R&D is the observable counterpart of the pro…t-motivated innovation e¤orts long identi…ed as a driver of technological progress, both by generating ideas for new products and processes directly (Romer, 1990 ; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and by raising an economy's absorptive capacity for ideas generated abroad (Gri¢ th et al., 2003).
Intuitively, subsidies to private R&D should encourage that activity at the margin. The theoretical motive for this government intervention is that projects of high value to society would not be funded by the private sector otherwise (Arrow, 1962; David et al., 2000) . This might be because important, paradigm-shift innovations: i) have high upfront costs, ii) are risky with high chance of failure, making capital more di¢ cult to raise relative to other activities (Bournakis and Mallick, 2018) , and iii) on arrival their returns spill over costlessly to competitors, due to the non-rival and partially non-excludable nature of ideas. The prediction is that R&D subsidies will raise aggregate productivity growth by correcting private R&D incentives, which are otherwise too low for these reasons. 3 The theoretical literature is discussed further in Section 2.
Direct support for business R&D is a key plank of the UK government's industrial strategy, so the policy relevance of this question continues to be high (HM Government, 2017).
The importance of direct R&D subsidies to the private sector is the subject of continuing debate, however, for several reasons. R&D policy programmes represent a considerable outlay of public money, but do they actually generate growth? Problems arise when it comes to testing the e¤ectiveness of these policies. First, innovation itself is di¢ cult to measure. R&D expenditures and patent counts are convenient measurable proxies for innovation outputs in empirical studies, but how far they capture innovation is questionable (Danguy et al. 2014 ).
Firms may patent as a signal to capital markets or to earn through licensing revenues, for instance, a non-innovative activity. Increased R&D expenditures due to subsidies may also be channelled straight into researcher wage increases, since researcher supply is relatively inelastic (Goolsbee, 1998) . Finally, governments may be bad at 'picking winners'if there is information asymmetry. 4 These theories would predict little relation between direct R&D subsidies and aggregate innovation.
The theoretical ambiguity just outlined is not easily resolved empirically, because it is di¢ cult to test the causal impact of R&D subsidies on innovation and aggregate productivity growth econometrically. See Becker (2015) for a brief discussion of the methodological issues, as well as a survey of recent empirical work on R&D policy e¤ectiveness. 5 This paper therefore takes a structural modelling approach, examining the aggregate impact of direct R&D subsidies within an identi…ed macroeconomic model of the UK: a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model economy. 6 Taking an open economy model which has been shown elsewhere to account well for the UK macroeconomy's behaviour (Meenagh et al., 2010) , we add an unambiguous role for direct R&D subsidies which a¤ect innovation incentives at the microfoundation level. Individuals weigh up the gain from innovation (R&D) against the cost of not working in regular labour; the subsidy enters this trade-o¤ by raising the marginal return to R&D (e¤ectively by lowering associated costs which distort the R&D decision). That choice in turn implies a systematic relationship from R&D subsidies to productivity which drives the model economy's behaviour. More speci…cally, temporary R&D policy shocks generate medium-term growth episodes; like Comin and Gertler (2006) , we investigate both short and medium-term business cycle dynamics.
Our key contributions lie in estimating and empirically testing this microfounded model by indirect inference methods (Le et al., 2011 (Le et al., , 2016 . This is a statistically powerful test which rejects misspeci…ed models sensitively, as we establish in the paper using Monte Carlo methods (cf. Le et al., 2016) . The exercise allows us to construct uncertainty bounds around our estimates and around the quantitative conclusions derived using the model. When we present the growth impact of a simulated policy reform in Section 4 below, we can then also give a clear indication of the accuracy of the results. We also test the DSGE model's identi…cation, applying the numerical identi…cation test proposed in Le et al. (2017) .
For this reason, the present paper is a useful complement to existing empirical work on the macroeconomic impact of direct R&D subsidies. By estimating the DSGE model and testing it in this way, the conclusions cannot be said to rely on an untested calibration.
Further value of the approach taken here lies in the ability to specify a particular causal 5 e.g. macroeconometric regressions (e.g. Bloom et al. 2002) su¤er from potential omitted variable bias, as R&D policies can be correlated with unobservable drivers of (or obstacles to) innovation. Such econometric models are essentially reduced forms in which one theory cannot be easily distinguished from another with quite di¤erent implications (the identi…cation problem). 6 The model assumes households and …rms follow their economic interests in the face of economic shocks, subject to market disciplines as assumed in standard economics and allowing for costs of adjusting over time. mechanism for growth in the DSGE model; hence there is no question surrounding the exogeneity of policy in the model. For instance, there is no possibility in the model of reverse causality such that R&D policy actually responds to growth or to omitted growth drivers, rather than being a growth determinant itself. This approach therefore bypasses di¢ culties associated with potential regressor endogeneity which are so hard to address conclusively in macro-level regressions (Becker, 2015) , while retaining the idea that hypotheses can be tested by classical econometric methods (an idea that receives less attention in the DSGE literature).
Another advantage is that we can look at a single country, the UK, without imposing homogeneity assumptions across a sample of countries which may actually di¤er in the relationship between R&D subsidies and growth.
We …nd robust evidence in this paper of a positive impact of shocks to direct R&D subsidies on the path of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and output. The results of our test suggest that increases in R&D subsidies generate medium term growth episodes. Simulating the estimated model shows that a one-o¤, temporary increase in R&D subsidies of 0.01 above trend leads to an average higher growth rate of 0.11 percentage points per annum over nearly two decades (70 quarters). Our power exercise implies the uncertainty interval for this average growth rate impact is (0.06, 0.17) percentage points per annum.
A review of some existing literature on R&D-driven growth is given in Section 2, focusing on the macroeconomic literature. Section 3 outlines the DSGE model including the growth process. Empirical work follows in Section 4, including an outline of the methodology and data, estimation results and a variance decomposition for the estimated DSGE model. We also report the results of our Monte Carlo exercise on the power of the testing method applied here, as well as simulation results for a controlled temporary R&D policy reform using the estimated model. Section 5 concludes.
LITERATURE
In the New Endogenous Growth theory, spillovers overcome diminishing returns to accumulable factors in the aggregate production function, generating sustained economic growth.
They also undermine private incentives to innovate since the innovator cannot appropriate the full return from his investment (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1990) . Supposing that a downward incentive e¤ect dominates, the broad ‡avour of policy recommendations coming out of these models is that research activities should be subsidised directly -or indirectly through …scal incentives -in order to bring private returns into line with the social rate, and that protection of intellectual property rights should be increased, enabling the innovator to appropriate more of the returns to his investment despite the non-rivalry of knowledge outputs.
The underlying structure of the environment can also play a role, depending on the particular model; competition policy and the reduction of barriers to entry and other market frictions may increase the innovation rate (see discussion in Aghion et al. 2013 ).
Pure endogenous growth models in the style of Romer (1990) predict large long-run growth responses to changes in the scale of the economy's R&D sector; but while R&D activity (in terms of labour inputs and investment) increased dramatically in the last century, long-run growth rates were largely stable. Since Jones (1995), a second generation of 'semi-endogenous' R&D-driven growth models has emerged which imply a weaker scale e¤ect, allowing R&D and policies incentivising it to have important transitional e¤ects on growth but not to determine the long-run. The choice of semi-versus fully endogenous growth mechanism can imply signi…cantly di¤erent optimal R&D tax and subsidy policies; see Sener (2008) for discussion.
We discuss semi-endogenous growth, given our own empirical focus on the transitional growth e¤ects of R&D policy.
A number of existing DSGE models explore the macroeconomic impacts of R&D policies by simulation, embedding a semi-endogenous R&D-driven growth mechanism and making additional modelling choices which o¤er various insights. For instance, policymakers may increase innovation through the R&D channel by subsidising human capital accumulation, exploiting complementarities between the two activities that arise through the use of highly McMorrow and Roeger (2009) examine the impact of R&D policy on growth in a global DSGE model calibrated to the EU and to the US. They add the semi-endogenous growth mechanism in Jones (1995) to the European Commission's QUEST III model (Ratto et al. 2009 ), …nding that subsidies to R&D make only a modest contribution to productivity growth. The supply of high-skilled workers is constrained so the subsidy impact is largely absorbed by increases in researcher wages (cf. Goolsbee, 1998) . Of course the overall impact is constrained by the semi-endogenous growth assumption. In the short run there is reallocation of high-skilled labour from the production sectors to the research sector, which dampens output directly following the reform (this is the case in the model we propose as well).
A key issue in such models is calibration of the R&D externality parameter. 7 process. The structure of their model di¤ers from ours, but we note their relatively high estimate of the intertemporal knowledge spillover parameter. This implies that shocks a¤ecting R&D intensity will have long-lasting macroeconomic e¤ects. They also …nd a high persistence 7 Where international spillovers are included there is both a domestic R&D externality parameter and an international externality to be calibrated. 8 Macro-regression studies are often defended on the grounds that "they help us update our priors about the impact of certain types of policies" (Rodrik, 2012, p. 141) and that "even simple or partial correlations can restrict the range of possible causal statements that can be made" (Wacziarg, 2002, p. 909) , but when models are not identi…ed it is not clear that this is defensible. We prefer a frequentist estimation strategy here since our reading of the empirical literature does not suggest an appropriate prior for parameters governing the R&D subsidy impact in our UK model. The approach taken here also allows us to evaluate the model's performance together with the estimated parameter, using the Indirect Inference test. Formal econometric evaluation of DSGE models is now receiving increasing attention in the literature; see Giacomini (2013) .
Before presenting the UK model in the next section, we highlight some of our modelling choices in the context of the DSGE literature discussed here -one notable di¤erence being that we abstract from knowledge spillovers in the growth process. Growth occurs in this model due to the representative agent's decision to spend time 'innovating'; the resulting innovation is excludably donated to the …rm, of which the agent is sole shareholder. 9 The assumption simpli…es the model considerably while allowing the important testable policy implication to emerge, that R&D subsidies stimulate productivity growth by o¤setting frictional barriers to R&D which tend to raise its costs. Thus we simply assume the existence of a distortion in the R&D margin which subsidies can eliminate; for instance, the fact that R&D tends to be risky which increases the cost of raising capital. The broader DSGE literature accomodates increasing theoretical complexity which is insightful; our aim is to strip back this complexity for the time being and see whether we …nd robust empirical evidence for a simple DSGE model in which R&D subsidies cause TFP behaviour. This is a nontrivial question, since there is a strong possibility that the causation works in the opposite direction, or that the e¤ect is simply negligible and that an exogenous growth model is more appropriate. If support is found for the simple mechanism we propose here, we can proceed to model the microfoundations with more complexity. which underwent several regime changes in the UK during this period. 12 To give power to our empirical test, we must use a long sample spanning 1981-2010, but for this period we would have trouble specifying a single monetary policy rule without including structural breaks. This is one practical reason to exclude nominal frictions. 13 Moreover, R&D works on the supply side of the economy and in the medium and long run these e¤ects should not be much if at all dependent on nominal rigidities (see e.g. the e¤ects of R&D policy in Varga and t'Veld, 2011, Figure 1 , p.658-59). This lends theoretical support to our decision to use an RBC model for this exercise.
14 Since this UK model has performed well in similar tests (Meenagh et al., 2010) , the introduction of the R&D policy variable should test whether this policy hypothesis alone has caused the rejection.
Consumer Problem
The consumer chooses consumption (C t ) and leisure (x t ) to maximise lifetime utility, U :
u(:) takes the form:
1 ; 2 > 0 are coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion; t and t are preference shocks, and 0 < 0 < 1 is consumption preference.
The agent divides time among three activities: leisure, labour N t supplied to the …rm for the real wage w t , and an activity z t that is unpaid at t but known to have important future returns. The time endowment is:
Here the consumer chooses leisure, consumption, domestic and foreign bonds (b, b f ) and bonds issued by the …rm to …nance its capital investment (b), and new shares (S p ) purchased at price q, subject to the real terms budget constraint.
The taxbill T t is de…ned further below. The only taxed choice variable in the model is z t ;
all other taxes are treated as lump sum to rule out wealth e¤ects. Since the choice of z t is left aside until Section 3.4 on endogenous growth, the taxbill is not relevant at this stage of the problem.
Pt :Ê t gives relative consumer prices. The nominal exchange rateÊ t is assumed …xed; Q t is then the relative import price. 16 Higher Q t implies a real depreciation of domestic goods on world markets and hence an increase in competitiveness; this can be thought of as a real exchange rate depreciation.
The consumer's …rst order conditions yield the Euler equation (5), the intratemporal con- 1 5 Price Pt of the consumption bundle is numeraire 1 6 b f t+1 is a real bond -it costs what a unit of the foreign consumption basket (C t ) would cost, i.e. P t (the foreign CPI). In domestic currency, this is P tÊ t. Assuming P t ' P f t (i.e. exported goods from the home country have little impact on the larger foreign country) the unit cost of b f t+1 is Qt. dition (6), 17 real uncovered interest parity (7), and the share price formula (8) . First order conditions onb t+1 and b t+1 combine forr t = r t . Indeed, returns on all assets (S
Equation 8 rests on the further assumption that q t does not grow faster than the interest rate,
The domestic country has a perfectly competitive …nal goods sector, producing a version of the …nal good di¤erentiated from the product of the (symmetric) foreign industry. The model features a multi-level utility structure (cf. Feenstra et al. 2014 ). The level of C t chosen above must satisfy the expenditure constraint,
Pt . C 10), subject to the constraint thatC t 6 C t .
At a maximum the constraint binds; 0 < ! < 1 denotes domestic preference bias. Import demand is subject to a shock, & t . The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign varieties is constant at = 1 1+ . First order conditions imply the relative demands for the imported and domestic goods:
1 7 Later we show that the return on labour time, wt, is equal at the margin to the return on zt.
Given equation 11 above, the symmetric equation for foreign demand for domestic goods (exports) relative to general foreign consumption is
* signi…es a foreign variable; ! F and F are foreign equivalents to ! and . Q t is the foreign equivalent of Q t , import prices relative to the CPI, and ln Q t ' ln p d t ln Q t . 18 An expression for p d t as a function of Q t follows from the maximised equation 10:
A …rst order Taylor expansion around a point where
loglinear approximation for this:
The export demand equation is then
where c collects constants and
Assuming no capital controls, the real balance of payments constraint is satis…ed.
Firm Problem
The representative …rm produces the …nal good via a Cobb Douglas function with constant returns to scale, where A t is total factor productivity:
and Pt is numeraire, Qt = P f t . If domestic export prices hardly in ‡uence the foreign CPI then P t ' P f t .
There are diminishing marginal returns to labour and capital. The …rm also faces convex adjustment costs to capital. The …rm undertakes investment, purchasing new capital via debt issue (b t+1 ) at t; the costr t is payable at t + 1. Bonds are issued one for one with capital units demanded:b t+1 = K t :The cost of capital covers the return demanded by debt-holders, capital depreciation and adjustment costs,ã t . 19 The pro…t function is:
w t is the real unit cost of labour; t and t are cost shocks capturing random movements in marginal tax rates. The consumer's …rst order conditions showedr t = r t . Substituting for b t+1 = K t andr t = r t , pro…ts are:
Here adjustment costs are explicit, having substitutedb t+1ãt
The …rm chooses K t and N t to maximise expected pro…ts, taking r t andw t as given.
Assume free entry and a large number of …rms operating under perfect competition. The optimality condition for K t equates the marginal product of capital (net of adjustment costs and depreciation) to its price, plus cost shock -d is the …rm's discount factor. Rearranged, this gives a non-linear di¤erence equation in capital.
Given capital demand, the …rm's investment, I t , follows via the capital accumulation identity.
The optimal labour choice gives the …rm's labour demand condition:
1 9 the adjustment cost attached tob t+1 is:b t+1ãt =b t+1 :
Internationally di¤erentiated goods introduce a wedge between the consumer real wage, w t , and the real labour cost for the …rm,w t . 20 The wedge is
implying, via 15, the following relationship:
Government
The government spends on the consumption good (G t ) subject to its budget constraint.
Spending is assumed to be non-productive (transfers). As well as raising tax revenues T t the government issues one-period bonds. Each period, revenues cover spending and the current interest bill: T t = G t + r t 1 b t and so b t = b t+1 . Therefore government debt is …xed in the model. Revenue T t is made up as follows.
s t is a proportional subsidy rate on time spent in activity z t . t , a lumpsum tax capturing the revenue e¤ects of all other tax instruments, responds to changes in s t z t to keep tax revenue neutral in the government budget constraint. Government spending is modeled as an exogenous trend stationary AR(1) process.
where j g j< 1 and g;t is a white noise innovation.
Productivity Growth
Assume that productivity growth is a linear function of time spent in some innovation-
where a 1 > 0. z t is the systematic channel through which policy incentives, s t , drive growth. 21 Here z t is assumed to be time spent in R&D.
The model is similar to Lucas (1990) where growth depends on time spent accumulating human capital. In the short term the return to labour (for a given level of human capital) is foregone to raise the human capital stock. The endogenous growth process below is adapted from Meenagh et al. (2007) to a decentralised framework.
Although in equation (28) TFP is a linear function of z t , in practice we model z t as a stationary mean zero variable. If z t was non-stationary then a shock to it would be permanent and would raise the balanced growth rate. This would produce endogenous growth but is inconsistent with the data: resources devoted to R&D have increased dramatically over the long term, while long run output growth has been broadly stable (cf. Jones, 1995) . In other words, equation 28 would imply that TFP is I(2), which is not supported. The model we set up therefore features a mechanism whereby temporary shocks to R&D around an exogenous trend generate permanent changes in the level of TFP and output, but cannot ultimately a¤ect the long run growth rate of the model. It thus generates similar behaviour to models of semi-endogenous growth in response to R&D policy. 22 , 23 The consumer chooses z t to maximise utility (eqn.s 1 and 2), subject to equations 3 ,4 and 26. We assume the consumer's shareholdings are equivalent to a single share:
The rational agent expects z t to raise her consumption possibilities through her role as the …rm's sole shareholder. She knows that, given equation 28, a marginal change in z t permanently raises productivity from t + 1. This higher productivity is fully excludable and donated to the atomistic …rm she owns; higher productivity is anticipated to raise household income via …rm 2 1 All other factors that systematically a¤ect growth are therefore in the error term. 2 2 In e.g. Jones (1995) and Segerstrom (1998) this is because the marginal idea product of R&D diminishes as the level of R&D increases, due to '…shing out' or increasing complexity. A permanent subsidy increase then results in a permanent increase in R&D, but with level rather than growth e¤ects on long run output per worker. 2 3 zt is not in the model in practice when it is solved but, conceptually, any deterministic trend has been removed. Likewise, a deterministic trend is removed from s 0 t and all other exogenous variables before solving the model. See Sections 3.6 and 4.7.1 2 4 This allows the substitution in the budget constraint that qtS
pro…ts paid out as dividends, d t (everything leftover from revenue after labour and capital costs are paid). The choice is thought not to a¤ect economy-wide aggregates; all prices are taken as parametric (note that the productivity increase is not expected to increase the consumer real wage here, though it does so in general equilibrium -cf. Boldrin and Levine, 2008) . 25 Substituting into the …rst order condition for z t using equation 28 and rearranging for At+1 At yields (after some approximation)
The full derivation is given in the Appendix. We focus on At and s 0 t of the form
where
26 Note that this relationship came out of the …rst order condition for z t . The household chooses z t taking all other sources of productivity growth as exogenous.
Equation 30 drives the behaviour of the model in simulations.
There are notable aspects of the R&D growth channel that we abstract from here. We do not include distance to the global technological frontier (cf. Grossman and Helpman, 1991); nor do we explicitly include spillovers in the micro-foundations (e.g. inter alia Jones, 1995). Many more theoretically rich models exist for how R&D subsidies can a¤ect productivity, and there is no suggestion that growth is in reality as simple as this model suggests. The decision we have made is to write down a straightforward and more general model which implies the reduced form process in equation 30; we view this model as representative of a class of theoretical models which have this implication. We then look at whether the approximations made here are empirically justi…able.
The growth channel, activity z t , is identi…ed in empirical work by the choice of data for the policy variable s 0 t ; z t itself does not feature in the model listing (Appendix B). The policy 2 5 Given the time endowment 1 = Nt +xt +zt , the agent has indi¤erence relations between zt and xt, between xt and Nt, and zt and Nt. The intratemporal condition in 6 gives the margin between xt and Nt; here we focus on the decision margin between zt and Nt, so the margin between zt and xt is implied. Therefore the substitution Nt = 1 xt zt can be made in the budget constraint. 2 6 Other terms in the expansion are treated as part of the error term.
variable is proxied by the rate of direct subsidies to private sector R&D; see Section 4.2.2. The most obvious way such a subsidy could drive growth would be by stimulating R&D activity, but this identi…cation strategy does not rule out other models with the same implication for the e¤ect of R&D subsidies on productivity growth (even if that might be because R&D subsidies simultaneously increase worker human capital through strategic complementarities as in Redding, 1996) . While in practice z t could comprise other mechanisms besides simple R&D activity, our focus is on testing the relationship in equation 30 from subsidies to TFP. 27 Substituting into 29 using 28 reveals a relationship between z t and s 
where e w;t = ln t + ln t + worker's response to a higher subsidy rate on z t is to reduce time spent in ordinary employment.
Closing the model
Goods market clearing in volume terms is:
All asset markets also clear.
A transversality condition is also required to ensure a balanced growth equilibrium is
reached for this open economy, to rule out growth …nanced by insolvent borrowing rather than growing fundamentals. The restriction on the balance of payments is that the long run 2 7 If the model were speci…ed in non-stochastic form, government intervention would not be justi…ed as there are no explicit distortions leading to suboptimal R&D; the subsidy itself could then generate a suboptimal welfare outcome. However, the model's residuals include temporary and permanent welfare distortions, along with nominal rigidities, the e¤ects of other tax instruments etc. See Brinca (2014) for the interpretation of model residuals as e¢ ciency wedges (also Sustek, 2011) . Given the presence of distortions to R&D incentives in the residuals, subsidies can be a second best policy. However, we intend this as a positive exercise into the TFP e¤ects of subsidies and do not emphasise the welfare properties of the model. change in net foreign assets (the capital account) is zero. At a notional date T when the real exchange rate is constant, the cost of servicing the current debt is met by an equivalent trade surplus.
The numerical solution path is forced to be consistent with the constraints this condition places on the rational expectations. In practice it constrains household borrowing since government solvency is ensured already, and …rms do not borrow from abroad. When solving the model, the balance of payments constraint is scaled by output so that the terminal condition imposes that the ratio of debt to gdp must be constant in the long run, b f t+1 = 0 as t ! 1, wherê
Yt+1 . The model is loglinearised before solution and simulation; the full model listing is in Appendix B.
Exogenous variables
Stationary exogenous variables are shocks to real interest rates (Euler equation), labour demand, real wages, capital demand, export demand and import demand. These are not directly observed but are implied as the di¤erence between the data and the model predictions.
Those di¤erences e i;t are treated as trend stationary AR(1) processes: e i;t = a i + b i t + i e i;t 1 + i;t (34) i;t is an i.i.d mean zero innovation term; i identi…es the shock. We model foreign consumption demand, government consumption, foreign interest rates and policy variable s 0 t similarly. AR (1) coe¢ cients i are estimated. Where expectations enter, they are estimated using a robust instrumental variable technique (Wickens, 1982; McCallum,1976) ; they are the one step ahead predictions from an estimated VECM. Where a i 6 = 0 and b i 6 = 0, detrended residualê i is used:
e i;t = e i;t â i b i t
The innovations i;t are approximated by the …tted residuals from estimation of equation 
Deterministic trends are removed from exogenous variables since they enter the model's balanced growth path. We focus here on how the economy deviates from steady state in response to shocks -in particular, stationary shocks to R&D subsidies. Such shocks will have a permanent shift e¤ect on the path of TFP via its unit root. Due to their persistence they also generate transitional TFP growth episodes above long-run trend. As mentioned in Section 3.4, this is how we achieve consistency with the data given our linear speci…cation in equations (28) and (30).
EMPIRICAL WORK

Indirect Inference Methods
The model in the preceding section is tested and estimated using the Indirect Inference Given parameter set , J bootstrap simulations are generated from the DSGE model.
Having added back the e¤ects of deterministic trends removed from shocks, an auxiliary model is estimated for all J pseudo-samples. The estimated auxiliary model coe¢ cient vectors a j ( j = 1; :::; J) yield the variance-covariance matrix of the DSGE model's implied distribution for these coe¢ cients. Hence the small-sample distribution for the Wald statistic W S( ) is obtained:
a j ( ) is the mean of the J estimated vectors and W ( ) = ( ) 1 is the inverse of the estimated variance-covariance matrix. The test statistic, W S ( ), is W S ( ) = (^ a j ( )) 0 W ( )(^ a j ( )) -this depends on the distance between a j ( ) and^ , where^ is the coe¢ cient vector estimated from the UK data. Inference proceeds by comparing the percentile of the Wald distribution in which the test statistic falls with the chosen size of the test; for 5% signi…cance, a percentile above 95% signi…es rejection. We can present the same information as a Mahalanobis distance or as a p-value.
For estimation, a 'simulated annealing'algorithm performs the indirect inference Wald test for points inside a bounded parameter space. We search for a structural parameter set such that the restrictions the model imposes, including the causal relationship from R&D subsidies to TFP, do not lead it to be rejected as a data generating process. This is discussed further below.
Data
UK Macroeconomic Data
We use un…ltered data from 1981 to 2010. For problems inherent in data …ltering see e.g. Hamilton (2016). Here we are interested in relatively long growth episodes in response to shocks propagated through non-stationary TFP; the risk of mistaking that response for a change in underlying trend and removing it is high with the HP …lter (cf. Comin and Gertler, 2006 ). The auxiliary model is therefore a Vector Error Correction Model since the data is nonstationary; this is discussed further in section 4.3. Key UK macroeconomic data is plotted in Figure 1 . Data sources are listed in Appendix C.
Data on R&D Subsidies
The hypothesis is that b 1 > 0 in equation 30, i.e. s ratio is interpolated from annual to a quarterly frequency using a constant average match interpolation. Figure 2 plots the series for constant average and quadratic average interpolation.
The detrended subsidy variable is modeled as a persistent but stationary AR(1) process (see exogenous variables section above).
This R&D subsidy variable excludes …scal incentives to R&D which have increased in the UK since 2000, so it is only a partial proxy for policy incentives to R&D. However, …scal incentives as measured by the OECD B-Index may a¤ect R&D and productivity growth di¤erently to direct subsidies (e.g. Foreman-Peck, 2013), so it is not immediately clear that we should combine them into a single index. Likewise, no indicator of intellectual property rights spans a long enough timeframe for this investigation; and for the UK such an indicator would show little time series variation. We could resort to patent counts to proxy innovation policy, but a) these are an outcome and may not be a good proxy for policy and b) they respond in a way that may have nothing to do with productivity (see e.g. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011, for related literature). For these reasons, the subsidy variable employed here is preferred. 
Auxiliary Model
The full solution to the structural model can be represented as a cointegrated VECM rearranged as a VARX(1) -see Appendix D. The general form is
The error q t contains suppressed lagged di¤erence regressors, while t captures the deterministic trend in x t (the balanced growth behaviour of the exogenous variables) a¤ecting both the endogenous and exogenous variables. (1) captures the deterministic trend in the data and simulations. Since the focus of the study is on the stochastic trend resulting from the shocks, the deterministic trend is not part of the Wald test on which the model's performance is evaluated.
Indirect Inference Testing and Estimation Results
We estimate a number of the structural parameters of the model using Indirect Inference and report those estimates as well as the Wald test statistic for the model with that set of parameters. The structural parameters we estimate are listed in Table 3 Lacking a compelling rationale for calibrating this model from the existing literature, starting values chosen for these are 0:1 and 0:06 respectively, and we search around these values in the estimation procedure. 29 The initial parameter set is given in Appendix F, along with the implied AR(1) coe¢ cients for stationary exogenous variables. Analysis of impulse response functions show real business cycle behaviour consistent with Meenagh et al. (2010) ; impulse responses for a one-o¤ policy shock are likewise as expected. A preliminary to the estimation is to set bounds on the parameter space; these are set at 30% either side of the initial calibration. If a parameter's starting value is inappropriate, the estimation process will move towards one of the initial bounds, indicating that the bound should be shifted.
When the model is estimated by Indirect Inference a structural parameter set is found such that the model is not rejected by the test. The estimates are shown in Table 3 , with the implied AR(1) coe¢ cients for the exogenous variables in Table 4 . For the parameters listed in Table 3 , column 3, the test statistic falls in the 77th percentile of the distribution, signifying a comfortable non-rejection. Several coe¢ cients have moved some way from their starting when the Indirect Inference test is applied to the model with this calibration it is rejected. 2 9 A small starting value for c 1 is preferred since the labour supply e¤ects induced by policy change should plausibly be small.
values. In terms of the key results of this study, the estimate for b 1 is 0:0901. This is the short run impact of a temporary shock to the direct R&D subsidy rate on TFP growth. To see the longer run impact of a one-o¤ shock to the subsidy rate necessitates impulse response analysis, which we present in Section 4.7. There we show that the estimated model presented and tested here implies that a one-o¤, temporary shock to the R&D subsidy rate of magnitude 0:01 stimulates an average increase in the per annum output growth rate of 0:0011 lasting over 17 years. This is a reasonably impressive e¤ect for such a small shock. Such implications …t with the results of e.g. Varga and t'Veld (2011, Fig.1 ) using QUEST III.
Assuming a 4 quarter lag for the impact of the subsidy shock yields a borderline nonrejection with a Wald percentile of 94.48, obtained from a di¤erent structural parameter set (Table 3 , col. 4). This is a much weaker result.
Variance Decomposition
A variance decomposition for key variables with this coe¢ cient set is reported in Table   2 . 30 See Appendix E for the full variance decomposition (all endogenous variables); here we pick out output and TFP due to their relevance for the growth question, as well as labour supply (impacted by the subsidy) and key open economy variables: the real interest rate, real exchange rate and net foreign assets. The identi…ed subsidy shock generates considerable variability across all endogenous variables and accounts for 62:9% of total variance in TFP in the estimated model, more than the independent shock to TFP. 31 The estimated value of b 1 is clearly large enough to distinguish this model clearly from an exogenous productivity growth model.
3 0 We bootstrap the model and calculate the variance of the simulated endogenous variables generated by each of the eleven shocks, taken one at a time. For each column, the cell values indicate the proportion of the total model variance for that endogenous variable generated by each exogenous variable; columns of Table 2 sum to unity. 3 1 The subsidy shock and shocks to e A;t are bootstrapped independently. 
Power Exercise
The small sample properties of Indirect Inference have been investigated elsewhere (see Le et al. 2016 for references). However, Monte Carlo results are di¢ cult to generalise from one context to another so we check the power of the Indirect Inference test for our particular setup. To do this, we introduce falseness into the structural parameters, , moving them away from prede…ned true values by a certain percentage (randomly in either a positive or negative direction). Using a bootstrapped Wald distribution based on the misspeci…ed model, we see whether the Indirect Inference test as implemented above will correctly reject this model given a sample from the true (correctly speci…ed) model. The rate at which the test statistic falls in the 95th-100th percentile range of the distribution, for a particular degree of falseness, gives a sense of how reliable the procedure is. Rejection rates are given in Table 5 . The results of the exercise indicate that the testing method applied in the study is powerful. Coe¢ cients just 2.5% away from their true values will result in a certain rejection.
The above power function holds when all parameters are falsi…ed together to the same degree. We would most of all like to know whether the addition of the R&D subsidy is appropriate. This policy a¤ects the model via parameters b 1 and c 1 . We therefore investigate the power of the test when these coe¢ cients alone are misspeci…ed, holding all other coe¢ cients to their true values. The results are reported in Table 6 . When just two coe¢ cients are falsi…ed the power of the test is reduced. However, the test rejects over 99% of the time when the coe¢ cients b 1 and c 1 are 50% away from their true values. This furnishes us with a con…dence interval for our estimates.
What we see here is that our estimates lie within de…ned and rather close accuracy bounds.
The R&D parameter cannot lie outside the region (0.04, 0.14) or the model would have been rejected; we conclude that R&D does a¤ect growth positively. More generally, we can be sure that the model's parameters must lie collectively within a range of 2.5% of their true values; that is to say, if they were all perturbed randomly more than this percentage, the model would be rejected. After 70 quarters the loglevel of output is 2 percentage points higher than its no shock state (note, balanced growth has been removed here). The average annual growth increase over the 17.5 year episode is therefore 0:11 percentage points per annum. 32 How con…dent can we be in these results? The power exercise above shows that the Indirect Inference test (exactly as applied in this paper) is robust against misspeci…cation in the model's structural parameters. In our 'worst case scenario'in which only the R&D subsidy parameters are misspeci…ed, we found that these estimates can deviate by up to 60%; that is, b 1 lies in the interval (0.04, 0.14). We use this to construct the uncertainty interval for the average annual There is the further issue of identi…cation. Work checking the identi…cation of rational expectations DSGE models …nds that they generally are overidenti…ed (the notable exception is models featuring sunspots); see Le et al. 2017 . It is a priori likely that the model we use here is identi…ed since models of this type routinely pass identi…cation tests, but in particular we would like to show that the reduced form of this model could not be confused with a model in which R&D subsidies respond endogenously to TFP. To check identi…cation we apply the numerical identi…cation test developed by Le et al (2017) . 33 For this test a 5 variable VARX (4) is used as the auxiliary model. We …nd that when the structural parameters are falsi…ed by 0.3% together (randomly, up or down), false models are rejected 100% of the time. Therefore the VAR distribution implied by the true model is clearly distinguishable from that implied by other models, even those with parameters in the near neighbourhood of the 'true'set.
FIG. 4 R&D subsidy variable -various detrending methods
Robustness checks
Robustness checks show that results are invariant to the interpolation technique (quadratic versus constant match) and to the way in which missing values were supplied for years 1982 and 1984. 34 We also check the detrending method for the R&D subsidy variable. Though direct subsidies have fallen steadily since the 1980s, from the late 1990s the trend slows. We therefore try removing the trend using i) the HP …lter and ii) a quadratic time trend (Fig.   4 ). The earlier results are robust for the HP …ltered series -the coe¢ cient set reported in The power exercise we conduct lends signi…cant robustness to these conclusions on the role of R&D subsidies. In our Monte Carlo study, the introduction of 2.5% misspeci…cation in the structural parameters leads to a 100% rejection rate. When falseness is introduced only into the two coe¢ cients particularly related to subsidies (b 1 , c 1 ) the test is still sure to reject the model when these two parameters stray further than 50% from their true values. This allows us to construct uncertainty bounds around our estimates (and hence around the predicted growth episode): in the case of b 1 ; the 'worst case'interval is (0:04; 0:14).
We also apply the numerical model identi…cation test proposed in Le et al. (2017) , and con…rm that the model is identi…ed. This is a key strength of the approach, as there is no ambiguity in the causality running between policy shocks and economic growth. A model in which growth causes policy, for example, would be clearly distinguishable from the model we have tested here. Therefore this study adds empirical support for a causal impact of R&D policy on transitional growth in the UK since the 1980s.
Finally, the study …ts within a wider research agenda on the role of R&D policy in economic growth in industrialised countries. The model abstracts heavily from the processes surrounding the R&D investment decision and the way that direct subsidies enter it in practice. A more elaborate model of the R&D channel could give greater insight into exactly how direct subsidies drive TFP at the level of microfoundations. In this study we provide evidence of the positive direction of the subsidy impact and the extent of that e¤ect on the macroeconomy, …ndings which are certainly of interest to policymakers and which seem to be of …rst order importance; future work can build on this.
A.1. First order condition for z
The …rst order condition for zt is:
At the (Nt; zt) margin, the optimal choice of zt trades o¤ the impacts of a small increase dzt on labour earnings, subsidy payments, and expected dividend income. Here,
and hence for
:::::
a1. In turn,
a1: It may be objected that dzt enhances output directly through its e¤ect on productivity (holding inputs …xed), and also induces the …rm to hire more capital to exploit its higher marginal product (similarly for labour). We assume the e¤ect of dzt on the future dividend (dt+i = t+i) is simply its direct e¤ect via higher TFP, on the basis that any e¤ects on input demands are second order. Therefore the expected change in the dividend stream is based on forecasts for choice variables (set on other …rst order conditions) that are assumed independent of the agent's own activities in context of price forecasts; she anticipates only the e¤ect of zt on the level of output that can be produced with given inputs from t + 1 onwards. With substitution from 28, the rearranged …rst order condition is:
On the left hand side is the return on the marginal unit of Nt, the real consumer wage; on the right is the present discounted value of the expected increase in the dividend stream as a result of a marginal increase in zt, plus time t subsidy incentives attached to R&D activity. 3 5 Substituting again from 28 for zt yields At+1 At = a1:
The preference shock to consumption, t , is an AR(1) stationary process t = t 1 + ;t . Setting 1 ' 1,
is approximated as a random walk, so Et
for all i > 0. 3 6 The expression becomes 
A.2. The labour supply response to subsidies
Taking the total derivative of the time endowment in 3 gives dxt = dNt dzt, or
in some initial steady state with approximately no z activity implies
The linearised system of optimality conditions and constraints solved numerically is given below. Each equation is normalised on one of the endogenous variables (constants are suppressed in the errors). Variables are in natural logs except where already expressed in percentages. For clarity, ln(C where the error qt now contains the suppressed lagged di¤erence regressors, and the time trend is included to pick up the deterministic trend in xt which a¤ects both the endogenous and exogenous variables. xt 1 contains unit root variables which must be present to control for the impact of past shocks on the long run path of both x and y. This VARX(1) approximation to the reduced form of the model is the basis for the unrestricted auxiliary model used throughout the estimation. The structural parameter set in Table 9 based on Meenagh et al. (2010) was used to initiate the Indirect Inference estimation process, which searched over points in the parameter space de…ned by the 30% bounds around these values (see Section 4.4). Table 10 gives the implied AR (1) 
